The proverbial ****, I understand, is shortly to hit the fan here as a result of hidden cameras in the room/s of a very well known hotel in this country. I understand they were originally installed to monitor 'staff theft' problems but it seems someone forgot to switch off the recorders when the guests checked in!!!!
I am informed that a certain legal bod is attempting to track down guests that stayed between certain dates to see if they feel motivated enough to take action...should be fun...
Regards
Nick
Tim
Tim Johnson
From: Scott Fuller fullers@fullergroup.com
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 1998 09:32:40 +1100
Reply to:
fdbug@fullergroup.com
ffullers@fullergroup.com
www.fullergroup.com
China's Spies Target Corporate America
In the great game of economic espionage, China is emerging as a bold new
player. Its primary mission: to get its hands on the world's most advanced
technology.
Edward A. Robinson
Reporter Associate: Ann Harrington
Wu seemed the ideal double agent. He was motivated, smart, and articulate,
and formed a strong bond with his FBI handler. And according to court
records, no sooner had the bureau started running Wu (code name: Succor
Delight) than he delivered the identities of his MSS handlers, their front
companies, other Chinese agents operating in the U.S., and even information
on a group of Yugoslavians who were trying to purchase Chinese rocket
launchers.
But in 1992, Wu's cover was blown, and today, instead of operating as an
FBI "foreign national asset," Wu sits in a federal prison in western
Pennsylvania serving a ten-year sentence for violating the Arms Export
Control Act. In an interview with FORTUNE, he says that he has filed a
petition to avoid the customary fate of freed foreign felons--being
deported home after he is released in 2001. "I hope I can stay here after
what I did for this country," Wu says in carefully phrased English. "There
is no doubt in my mind that if the Chinese get their hands on me, I will
die."
As this disturbing episode suggests, China has for some time been spying on
corporate America. What's only beginning to be understood is the scope and
depth of its intelligence-gathering apparatus. "This is serious business,"
says Sen. Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. "China is trying to make the great leap forward,
technologically speaking, and it has great needs for information,
especially in the high-tech field. This is going to be an ongoing challenge
for both law enforcement and business."
Indeed. Intelligence officials, members of Congress, corporate security
directors, and former Chinese spies themselves tell FORTUNE that over the
past several years Chinese-backed industrial spying has increased
dramatically against U.S. business. In a soon-to-be-released survey of
1,300 major U.S. companies, the American Society for Industrial Security
(ASIS), an association for corporate-security types, found that America
business now sees China as its No. 1 foreign economic-espionage threat.
According to the experts, China's commercial spy apparatus has been
targeting two fronts simultaneously: the U.S. government and corporate
America. Suspicions that Beijing sought to pilfer classified economic
reports from Washington are already creating a buzz on Capitol Hill. Senate
Republicans investigating the Clinton campaign fundraising scandal have
suggested that John Huang, formerly assigned to the Taiwan desk in the
Commerce Department, may have passed secret economic and trade material to
China. Democrats respond that the Republicans have no hard evidence to
prove such a charge. Huang's lawyer denies the charge.
But the evidence for a PRC assault on corporate America is stronger. Recent
examples:
. Amgen discovered that a Chinese spy had infiltrated its organization and
was trying to steal a vial of cell cultures for Epogen, now a
$1.2-billion-a-year anemia drug.
. A Chinese spy in Hong Kong was recently caught using sophisticated
telecommunications software to secretly listen in on sensitive phone
conversations between American executives.
. A Chinese engineer working at a Boulder, Colo., software company
allegedly stole proprietary source code and peddled it to a PRC company. As
a result, the company went out of business.
To be sure, China is not alone in this game. In January, FBI Director Louis
Freeh testified to Congress that the companies or governments of 23
countries are currently involved in the illicit acquisition of U.S. trade
secrets and that 12 of those have aggressively "targeted U.S. proprietary
economic information and critical technologies."
Before China emerged as a major new player in this old game, Japan and
France clearly led the pack. In the 1980s, Hitachi was caught trying to
steal secrets from IBM. More recently the Commerce Department warned
American aerospace executives to watch out for spying by French
intelligence at the Paris Air Show--Hughes Aircraft pulled out altogether.
Of course, the U.S. itself is not above blame. Just last year Germany
reportedly accused an American diplomat of committing economic espionage by
trying to obtain information on high technology. It expelled the diplomat,
who was believed to be a CIA officer operating undercover.
And now, into this wilderness, steps China. Says Richard Heffernan, a
corporate security consultant based in Branford, Conn.: "It is a naive
company that thinks that just because it doesn't have a venture in China,
it's not at risk of being penetrated here at home." Late last year a
concerned Congress passed a law that requires the U.S. intelligence
community to prepare a classified report specifically on Chinese
intelligence activities, citing economic-espionage operations as one of its
top priorities. On top of that, the U.S. Trade Representative's Office is
insisting that the Chinese government take action against industrial
espionage and product piracy as a condition of joining the World Trade
Organization.
The Chinese government flatly denies that it is involved in economic
espionage. China does say that it is eager to absorb technology from around
the world and sometimes uses its market might to get foreign companies to
share their technology. Explains Yu Shuning, the press secretary at the
Chinese Embassy: "For our modernization program we are trying hard to learn from others. But everything is done on a commercial basis for everyone's
mutual benefit. When you sell your products to China, you earn a profit,
and in this kind of deal we should benefit also, and sometimes that may be from technology transfer, but this is always done through lawful, normal
means."
Chinese industrial spying is believed to run the gamut from routine
competitive intelligence gathering of company information on Websites and
at trade shows to the theft of company trade secrets from offices and labs.
No one really knows for sure the value of the secrets stolen or which
industries have been hit the hardest--although computers, biotech, and
defense probably top the list.
As experts take a closer look at China's intelligence operation, they are
also finding it difficult to determine how organized it is. Is Beijing
using its spy services to direct an overarching program of industrial
espionage in the U.S., or is Chinese spying driven primarily by independent
black-marketers out to pocket illicit profits?
Nicholas Eftimiades, an intelligence officer with the Pentagon's Defense
Intelligence Agency and author of the book Chinese Intelligence Operations,
believes that Beijing's intelligence services have erected an extensive spy
network in the U.S. that bears all the hallmarks of a John le Carre spy
novel. Eftimiades says the network focuses as much on netting commercial
secrets as on traditional military and political targets.
According to Eftimiades, officials at the Ministry of State Security, which
runs civilian intelligence activities domestically and abroad, "task"
agents to acquire products or data requested by Chinese industry. "They
request thousands of items from abroad every year," agrees Stanislav Lunev,
a former colonel in the Soviet Union's military-intelligence branch, the
GRU, who was stationed in Beijing. Some of those items might be
off-the-shelf products like a fertilizer, a machine tool, or a compact-disk
player, and the Chinese enterprise requesting the item might simply be
seeking to harmlessly "reverse engineer" it. But many of the items sought
are also trade secrets, says the former Russian spy, who defected to the
U.S. in 1992. "Only now are American companies starting to open their eyes
and see the level of Chinese espionage in their country," says the old cold
warrior, with a wry smile.
Both Eftimiades and Lunev say the MSS recruits professionals, college
students, and scientists to be agents in the U.S. Some are instructed to
ingrain themselves in companies, universities, and government, and provide
a lifetime of service to their spymasters. Information funneled back to
China could be as harmless as an annual report or as harmful as proprietary
computer code developed after years of R&D spending. One such former
Chinese agent, who fears for family members back home and has asked to
remain anonymous, has told FORTUNE about a school in Nanjing that trains
these spies. Over the past decade, this former agent has periodically
recognized fellow graduates from the school working in companies from
Silicon Valley to Massachusetts and even in the halls of government in
Washington.
Systematic as all this sounds, there is also evidence that a great deal of
Chinese espionage is actually not so organized, but rather the work of
freebooters. Though they might exploit connections to the Chinese state,
most of these types are operating on their own for lucre, pure and simple.
Take the case involving Amgen, the biotechnology firm based in Thousand
Oaks, Calif. In 1993 the company's information-security director, William
Boni, learned through an anonymous letter that an employee was poised to
steal a vial of cell cultures for Epogen, a drug that helps kidney dialysis
patients and that had generated $587 million in revenue for Amgen that
year. Boni pulled the accused thief's phone records and saw that over the
past few weeks the man had placed more than 70 personal telephone calls to
China.
Working with the Hong Kong office of Kroll Associates, the New York
private-investigation firm, Boni learned that the employee was hunting for
Epogen buyers in China and had, through intermediaries, made contact with
Chinese government officials. Boni and his Kroll associates put the
employee and his partner under surveillance. Then, on a Sunday evening, the
spies entered Amgen's labs, and Boni's team pounced. Stunned, the employee
confessed to the plot. Yet Amgen chose not to pursue any criminal action
because Boni had stopped him before any real damage had been done. All the
company did was fire the man.
Chinese spy operations can run from the sublime to the ridiculous. In one
episode that smacked more of Maxwell Smart than James Bond, members of a
Chinese scientific delegation at a Paris trade show were seen dipping their
neckties into a photo-processing solution made by Agfa, the German
photography company. Apparently the delegates--much to the amusement of
French security officials --hoped to analyze "specimens" of the solution
taken from their ties.
Yet other incidents reveal a high degree of sophistication. In one case
three years ago, security consultant Heffernan exposed a Chinese spy in
Hong Kong who was trying to learn an American high-tech company's secrets
by manipulating a piece of telephone software known as executive override.
That feature allows anyone to listen in on lines. The spy, however, had
disabled the warning tone indicating the call is being monitored and had
used the program to eavesdrop on sensitive conversations between
executives. Fortunately, the spy left an obvious electronic fingerprint on
his handiwork, and he was caught. Even though the company's top brass were
furious, little was done, other than sending the exposed operative on his
way.
Why did Heffernan's clients let the guy go? Actually, this reaction is not
uncommon. Companies victimized by espionage are concerned that going to the
authorities will publicize the incident and leave the impression that they
don't take their security seriously or are even incompetent. Such a
disclosure can dampen a stock price, scare off customers, or in serious
cases topple senior executives. "When a company gets hit by a spy, it's
like it suddenly has a sexually transmitted disease," says Kevin D. Murray,
a New Jersey-based specialist in electronic-surveillance detection.
"Everyone wants something done to prevent it from spreading, but no one
wants to talk about it, even though talking about it, sharing the
experience, is the only way to make it safer for everyone to do business."
Chinese espionage poses a special set of worries. The last thing U.S. firms
want to do is antagonize Chinese officials, who hold the keys to a market
with 1.2 billion people--something an embarrassing public accusation of
spying is likely to do. James P. Chandler, president of the National
Intellectual Property Law Institute in Washington, D.C., says scores of
American companies are continually parrying Chinese penetration, both in
ventures in China itself and at home in the U.S., but making little noise
about it publicly. His latest message: Corporations should report incidents
of spying to the authorities. Chandler argues that when a victim keeps a
crime hushed up, it sends a dangerous message that it's okay to steal
intellectual property. And that will encourage countries like China to keep
on spying. "The gravity of what's involved here has not come home to a lot
of U.S. industry, from lawyers on up to senior management," says Chandler.
That said, Americans should be careful not to brand all Chinese businessmen
as spies, especially at a time when U.S.-China relations are already
strained. In fact, one can argue that there's a gray area between spying
and good old-fashioned competitive intelligence. "We need to be very
careful with these kinds of issues," says Evan Feigenbaum, a fellow with
the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University and
an expert on China. "People can be very incautious with the term
'espionage,' and the simple fact that the Chinese are interested in
technology doesn't mean it's espionage."
So there lies the dilemma. On the one hand, a CEO must protect his trade
secrets. But he also doesn't want to create a suffocating, Orwellian
culture that stifles the free flow of ideas--something that has become an
increasingly vital ingredient in today's knowledge economy. The fact is,
companies must strike a fine balance between protecting their intellectual
property and encouraging open discourse with those outside their corporate
walls. And with China's bold new entrance into the industrial spy game,
that's not going to be easy.
Were you aware that now Communist China has control of both the Atlantic
and Pacific ports of the Panama Canal, which Jummy Carter had so generously
gave away?
Hutchinson Port Holdings Ltd, a subsidiary of China Ocean Shipping Company
(COSCO) through Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd, which is controlled by the Chinese
government, was awarded a 25 year lease to operate the Atlantic and Pacific
ports at each end of the canal. Among the terms of lease agreement is
that Hutchinson will have veto rights regarding use of the land adjacent to
the ports, which would include US military bases. Another is that
Hutchinson will be exempt from Panama's labor laws for three years. Did
anyone notice that the Panamanian lawyer for Hutchinson (and COSCO) in that
deal was Hugo Torrijos, who is also the head of the Panamanian port
authority that awarded the contract to COSCO? U.S. intelligence was sure
caught napping on that one.
By now we have learned about questionable Chinese campaign contributions
and their visits to the White House. The Clinton administration permitted
COSOCO to take over the entire 133 acre former U.S. Navy station at Long
Beach, California, for which the Chinese government, via COSCO, is to pay
$14.5 million a year. Terms of that 20 year lease agreement, however,
also call for Long Beach to pay approximately $235 million for
modernization of the facility. Also, a penalty clause would give COSCO
$32 million in dockside cranes plus about $200,000 for moving expenses.
That contract, by the way, was finalized shortly after the Feds caught one
of COSCO's ship trying to smuggle about 2,000 CHICOM Ak-47's into Oakland,
California.
As if that were not enough, COSCO received a $138 million US government
loan guarantee to build four ships in Mobile, Alabama, which COSCO has 25
years to pay off. (Does anyone want to take any bets on that happening?)
Many American companies can not get any help like that from our own
government.
COSCO, through Hutchinson, recently took over control of the port facility
in Singapore. COSCO is now in Vancouver, Canada, Long Beach, California,
Balboa and Cristobal, Panama, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Shanghai, as well as many other locations worldwide.
The bottom line of all this appears to be long-term job security for TSCM
types.
Thanks to Bob for the info. He's been at it again.
Ju Yijie is the head of the Chinese Economic Trade Development Office there
in panama City, and many suspect that he is with the CHICOM Ministry of
State Security (MSS). He is quite ruthless. Last year he undermined the
"Universal Congress on the Panama Canal" held in Panama City and sponsored
by Panamanian President Perez Balladares. Although alot of heads of state
and top level corporate executives were invited, he managed to intimidate
many of them so much that they declined to attend. President Lee Teng-hui
of Taiwan was there, but he was greatly overshadowed by Ju Yijie.
Significantly, Chang Yung-fa, who is the head of the largest shipping
company in Taiwan, Evergreen Marine Corporation, backed down and did not
attend.
As you probably have heard through your own lines, the CHICOMs are very
active in SIGINT and COMINT operations, and we can expect greatly increased
esppionage activities from both the COSCO ships and from their facilities
at Long Beach. From other sources, I hear that they are getting heavily
involved with interceptions of communications from Satellites. Anyone,
especially contractors, who has a security sense at all should be
contacting you folks.
That reminds me, why aren't you in the business of checking and certifying
SCIF's to make sure that they are secure and do not have any leakage?
That is what I used to do, i.e., check them in accordance with NSA 66-1 (or
was it 65-1? I don't remember now) That was good business, and there was
a tremendous profit margine for anyone who knew what they were doing.
Catch ya later,
Bob
Last things first:
As for the other things, contractors are restricted by the bucks they can
spend and the money isn't typiocally there until after the damage has been
done. They are almost as bad as the government: if you don't catch a spy
inside the classified files, there is no threat. That appears to be the
attitude.
I am getting a few inquiries about doing work on a contract basis for
certain contractor facilities. But most of that will be let to the beltway
bandits; they have the resources and the money to go after those things.
I've always been discarded out-of-hand when it came to bidding. Once, I
was with another organization and their response was that the contract
manager (me) didn't have enough knowledge in the area of TSCM. I pretty
much gave up at that point, knowing the bid were already weighed against
me. (BTW, I know who wrote the specs, who had some oversight on decisions
and who ended up getting the contract. Guess what big umbrella all that
activity feel under?
Government contracts probably aren't worth the effort to go after. You
have to have unlimited resources (personnel and equipment) available and in
place before you can even bid and that is no guarantee they will look at
you. Then they write the contract in such a way that you have to be ready
to travel on a couple of days notice with little advance knowledge of where
you're going or how you'll get your equipment past foreign customs.
I'll bet I sound like I've been eating sour grapes. I wish I was. But
right now, I feel like crap. I definately have to get to the doctor
tomorrow and see what the heck is wrong with me.
If you hear of any of those fabulous TSCM jobs just lying around waiting to
be plucked, definately keep me in mind. Although I don't see how I'll be
able to work them into my immediate future schedule. I'm already doing one
to two jobs a week and referring some to other people. Damn, I need to win
a lottery so I can hire someone else. :>)
Tim
A good book for insight is, CHINESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS" by Nick
Eftimiades, who is former CIA and now a China specialist with
DIA/Counter-intelligence. The book came out about three years ago.
Something from - you guessed it - yet another Bob.
Here are a couple of items found recently while travelling on business:
The type of business I'm in is extremely competitive (Telecom
instrumentation and test equipment) but it usually isn't that cut-throat.
None the less - with the Xxxxxx xx Xxxxxxxxxxx on the loose out there, and
others like them, it seems that it is becoming easier to stumble into weird
situations. (Oops, better delete that reference to the "church" - we don't
want to get a rattlesnake in the mailbox.)
Any thoughts on the risks of business travel?
Best Regards,
"Bob"
Here's something else from another "Bob".
Tim,
I've been following the recent information on the Chinese threat to our
national security as well as our industrial might. As an old navy SIGSEC
operator I know how good these operator can be. I also know how easy most
Americans make it for these collection operators. We were always briefing
COMSEC and OPSEC to various commands. Industry needs to learn the lessons
the military learned the hard way.
I've been out of the navy almost 10 years now and I'm amazed that I'm back
doing threat briefings dealing with the same problems I did 10 years ago.
Only now the bad guys are Russian Organized Crime and the Drug Cartel.
Instead of briefing military commands I'm briefing the Federal Law
Enforcement community. What really scares me is their attitudes, almost
across the board they feel they can't be monitored, bugged or taped. Yet
they put extreme emphasis on Title 3 operations (legal wiretaps) to put the
bad guys away.
Anyway, I would like to ask you if you could solicit your network of
friends and colleagues for any information that can be shared on Criminal
SIGINT Monitoring. I've picked up rumors of U.S. Military trained
personnel going to work for the Drug Cartels providing SIGINT against law
enforcement operations. I've heard traffic analysis against secure
networks has been provided to local drug organizations. As for the
Russians it only makes sense to me that they would use SIGINT monitoring to
further their goals. They certainly have enough highly trained personnel
to draw upon.
Any information gained will be used to update the briefings I'm providing
to various federal law enforcement agencies.
Thanks, keep up the good work!
"Bob"
I thought this article might be of interest to you, Jim Humphrey:
March 29 1998EUROPE
On the offensive: Russian gangs are spreading, linking with mafia dons
such as John Gotti
Crime kings meet to carve up Europe
Dividing Europe's spoils of crime
IN the ancient French town of Beaune, the strange mix of nationalities and
expensive limousines escaped the notice of most residents, who were more
interested in the price of wine at a nearby auction.
Only now has the reason for an autumn gathering of Russian, Chinese,
Japanese, Italian and Colombian "businessmen" at a hotel in the heart of
Burgundy become apparent. According to newly disclosed French intelligence
reports, representatives of the world's leading organised crime syndicates
were holding a summit to discuss carving up western Europe for drugs,
prostitution, smuggling and extortion rackets.
Immaculately dressed gangsters from a dozen of the world's most ruthless
crime rings met to consider greater co-operation, a pooling of expertise
and, most importantly, to welcome their Russian "brothers" to the elite
"club" responsible for a worldwide industry estimated to be worth £500
billion a year.
Since the Beaune summit in November 1994, there have been two other
gatherings of crime bosses on chartered yachts in the Mediterranean,
according to senior intelligence sources in Europe and America.
The message from the summits is clear: international criminal gangs are
more organised than ever, even down to dividing up territories in European
cities. "They split the cities into suburbs," said Serge Sabourin, of
Interpol, the global police intelligence body. "In rural areas they are
divided by type of activity."
Police believe the gangs liaise to ensure they are not crowding individual
drug routes, agree the amount of drugs that each can bring into countries
to avoid flooding markets, share equipment such as boats and arms, and hire
out specialists to each other, particularly in the growing "cyber-crime"
industry.
The new French intelligence reports have come to light after a high-profile
murder trial in France, which threw up links between one of the six
victims, a Russian millionaire businessman, and the mafia.
The Beaune summit was the first time French intelligence was able to
monitor the entry of senior Russian gangsters into the country. The Russian
mafia is understood to have been represented by Vyacheslav Ivankov, known
as "the Jap" because of his Far Eastern appearance. Two days later a
Georgian film producer was gunned down in Paris after being branded a
traitor by the organisation.
Ivankov, who is said by Russian police to have earned £200,000 a day, has
subsequently been jailed for 10 years for extortion in the United States.
But his Moscow-based group has continued to expand, particularly into
northern Europe, specialising in prostitution and fraud.
According to European and American intelligence sources, the Russians have
emerged as significant players on the western European stage in recent
years. There are now more than 8,000 organised crime groups in Russia, with
two-thirds of the country's economy said to be under their sway. Two
hundred of them have criminal ties in 50 countries.
Russian mobsters control massive extortion, fraud and prostitution rackets
in Germany, Italy, Holland and Belgium and are beginning to get a foothold
in Britain. In Italy, their influence in some parts of the country is
already greater than that of the Italian mafia, according to police.
At the Beaune summit, the Italian mafia was represented by the Gambino clan
>from New York, whose boss is John Gotti, currently serving a life sentence
for murder and racketeering. He is said to be so powerful that he still
runs his empire from prison in America. Police say the Gambino clan, which
has its roots in Italy and numbers about 500 people, has concentrated on
southern Europe, specialising in arms, narcotics, gambling and
loan-sharking.
Alongside them were representatives from at least three other groups.
They included:
ïThe Sun Yee On triad from Hong Hong, which is reputed to have more than
30,000 members worldwide. The group is prominent in Britain, Holland,
Belgium and France. It is involved in loan-sharking, prostitution,
money-laundering, smuggling illegal immigrants and counterfeit currency.
ïThe Yakuza from Japan. Police believe there are about 100,000 mainly
white-collar members, who tend to stay out of legitimate business and run
prostitution, debt-collection and big-business rackets. They have strong
ties with extreme right-wing groups.
ïThe Colombian cocaine cartel from Medellin. It was formerly led by Pablo
Escobar, the infamous drug baron killed during a shoot-out with police.
Today the cartel is more fragmented and has been overtaken by a Colombian
rival, the Cali cartel, led by Orlando Sanchez.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, director of the global organised crime project at the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, said:
"We know organised crime groups have met to carve up the planet . . . There
has been an astonishing growth in transnational groups. The legal economy
has gone global and the crime economy has gone global as well."
The London-based National Criminal Intelligence Service is particularly
concerned by the growth of Turkish drug traffickers in Britain. This
weekend Huseyin Baybasin, 41, a Turk, was arrested in Holland during a
massive anti-drug smuggling swoop in Britain, Holland, Belgium, Italy,
Turkey, Germany and Romania. Five people were also arrested in London,
three of whom were charged yesterday with various offences.
Additional reporting: Michael Sheridan, Hong Kong and Mark Franchetti, Moscow
Dividing Europe's spoils of crime
TURKISH GANGSTERS are responsible for 80% of the heroin smuggled into
Britain each year. They also specialise in money laundering throughout
western Europe
THE GAMBINOS and other American-based mafia groups have forged strong links
in Italy and concentrate their activities in southern Europe. They are
responsible for arms smuggling, illegal gambling and loan shark ventures
TRIAD GROUPS from Hong Kong are responsible for prostitution operations in
Holland and Belgium. At their most vicious, they imprison young girls as
sex slaves
COLOMBIAN CARTELS, particularly the Cali and those from Medellin, flood
Italy, Germany and other western European countries with hundreds of tons
of cocaine a year
RUSSIAN MAFIA GROUPS, the Organisatsya, emerged as big-time crime "players"
at the 1994 Beaune summit. They have established extortion, fraud and
prostitution rackets in Germany and Italy, and are spreading westwards
Any comments from the readers
Tim
Where the Spies Are
in a survey conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security,1,300
American companies were asked to cite the foreign country that poses the
greatest economic-espionage threat. Here is how they ranked
(preliminary results):
Canada
Tim,
Canada
Reference your posting of 20 March regard Communist China:
Bob,
SCIF certification is almost a past thing. I've had an opportunity to do
several preliminary inspections to insure the facility was prepared (to the
best of my ability), but I wasn't even aware that they were farming those
things out. The government teams always came after I did; mostly OSI,
based on my intel.
Tim,
Hi Tim,
I was wondering - has anyone else made any accidental discoveries they
might share?
Tim
Photograph: Colin Davey
by Andrew Alderson and Carey Scott, Paris